Part III: "Systems Thinking" in the Natural Sciences - Illustrations From the History of Science

"Science is about things . . . There are two ways we can deal with these things. The first and most obvious one is to describe them . . . But description in itself is dissatisfying and insufficient. It is a large heap with no order to it. Finding the order in the descriptive facts is the great purpose of science. The making of generalization-sometimes called theories, or laws, or principles-about facts is always considered the greatest triumph in the human pursuit of science. These generalizations vary greatly in their character. Sometimes they are a simple classification of the facts. This serves to give some order to the heap, so that Nature appears to have a system." (Bonner, 1969, 22).

In the natural sciences, Charles Darwin appears to have engaged in systems thinking when he utilized observation-based factual data from the research literature of two disciplines (comparative anatomy and physiology) and his own extensive field observations, to facilitate his capacity to recognize the essential properties of biological evolution through natural selection (Caskie, 1994, 14). Likewise, Thomas Henry Huxley, biologist, teacher, and friend & defender of Charles Darwin, appears to have utilized systems thinking when he challenged the traditional compartmentalization of zoology and botany by advocating for the complete unification of biology. Huxley's ability to "think systems" and see the interrelationships between biology's sub-disciplines, contributed to his having a substantial impact on the teaching of biology in the twentieth century (Bonner, 1993, 6).

Analyzing an animal society as a "whole" may make the organic properties of that society more accessible and observable, and provide the researcher with the opportunity to make easier comparisons between life forms (Bonner, 1955, 4). It seems evident that evolutionary biologist John Bonner was engaging in systems thinking forty years ago when he commented that: "All living things have a certain sameness, and one does not have to scratch far below the surface to see this. We can learn some of the basic principles of life from animal societies, from a single cell, or from a multicellular organism" (Bonner, 1955, 4).

More recently, Edward. O. Wilson, entomologist, evolutionary biologist, and principle founder of the discipline "sociobiology", commented that biologists have always had an interest in making comparisons between animal societies ó particularly between invertebrates, especially insect societies, and vertebrates societies. Wilson believes that many biologists desire to identify the common properties of disparate societies in order to gain insight into all aspects of social evolution, including the social evolution of the human species. The goal of this rudimentary form of ìsystems thinkingî is to eventually establish the same research parameters and quantitative theory; and use it for analyzing such diverse animal societies as termite colonies and troops of rhesus macaques.

According to Wilson, although this may seem like an arduous task, the result of this effort will be the realization of a unified science of sociobiology. Wilson believes that this effort represents one of the "great manageable problems of biology for the next twenty or thirty years." He notes that as his own studies have progressed, he has become increasingly impressed with the functional similarities between invertebrate and vertebrate societies, and less impressed with the considerable structural differences between them (Wilson, 1980, 4-5). In a recent interview, Wilson commented that his personal need and passion for creating order coupled with his desire to do more than "just natural historyî - that is descriptive science - has motivated him to pursue developing a comprehensive theory of sociobiology (Campbell, 1996, 94).

Wilson believes that as movement is made towards establishing a unified science of sociobiology, certain biological traditions that use "ad hoc terminology and crude models" ñ such as ethology and comparative psychology - will be "cannibalized" from both ends by two emerging disciplines ó integrative neurophysiology and sociobiology/behavioral ecology (see Figure 1). The biological disciplines that survive this theoretical "shakedown" will be the ones that skillfully utilize natural systems thinking to develop methods of comparative analysis that are applicable across all levels of social organization (Wilson, 1980, 5-6; 1996, 158).

 

Wilson describes the research enterprise associated with this unified biological science as being "pluralistic". Species are selected for analysis based on the ease of access provided to a particular level of organization. Data from laboratory and field observations can only be assimilated and synthesized together when each species' idiosyncrasies are interpreted according to its evolutionary history and placed in the larger ecosystem. Enduring theoretical constructs of a unified biological theory will eventually emerge after the accumulation of "enough" field and laboratory data. Wilson declines to speculate on the amount of data that will be needed before a unified biological theory emerges (Wilson, 1996, 158). The acquisition of a unified biological theory and the more sophisticated and esoteric research activities this permits, will serve as principle criteria and indicators that the discipline of biology has finally reached scientific "maturity" (Kuhn, 1962, 11).

 

 

Part IV: Precursors to a Comprehensive Science of Human Behavior

At the onset of his essay, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn details the people, literature, research, events, and fortuitous circumstances that influenced him as he was formulating the concepts for that provocative essay. One of the fortuitous circumstances removed Kuhn from his "element" ñ that is, the community of physical and natural scientists, and immersed him in a community of social "scientists" at "The Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences" for the 1958-59 academic year. Through this experience, Kuhn was confronted with the significant differences that exist between social "science" communities and natural science communities (Kuhn, 1962, vii-viii).

Most noteworthy, Kuhn was struck by the number and the extent of the overt disagreements that exist between behavioral researchers over the nature of legitimate research areas and methodologies. He reflected on this phenomenon, and pointed out that the natural science disciplines ñ such as astronomy, physics, chemistry, and segments of biology - routinely fail to evoke such intense controversies over the fundamentals of nature and research ó disagreements that are so pervasive in the psycho-social disciplines ñ such as psychology and sociology (Kuhn, 1962, vii-viii).

Kuhn's attempt to discover the source of the differences between the two communities ñ the natural sciences and psycho-social disciplines, led him to appreciate the importance of a community having a set of universally accepted achievements ñ also known as: a "paradigm" - as a prerequisite to that field of study being recognized as a bonafide science. A set of universally accepted achievements serves the community by providing practitioners with standard research problems and solutions (Kuhn, 1962, viii). Throughout his essay, whenever Kuhn compares the differences between natural science communities and communities of human behavior researchers, he routinely expresses considerable doubt over whether any of the psycho-social disciplines have obtained their first universally sanctioned paradigm. Consequentially, Kuhn would probably contend that as of 1962 - his publication date, all of the psycho-social disciplines were still technically in their "prehistories" as legitimate sciences.

According to Kuhn, in the absence of a paradigm or some candidate for a paradigm, all facts that could possibly pertain to the emergence of a new science are treated with equal relevance. This results in a more chaotic and random fact-gathering activity than the focused research activity that is associated with paradigm-based science (Kuhn, 1962, 15). Once a field of study crosses the science prehistory/history divide through embracing it's first universally sanctioned paradigm, from that era forward, there is no such thing as research in the absence of a paradigm for that particular science (Kuhn, 1962, 79). Kuhn claims that, within a bonafide science, to reject one paradigm, without simultaneously embracing another, amounts to a rejection of science itself. Furthermore, such an act would reflect back on the character of the scientist - not the paradigm - who would then be viewed by his or her colleagues as something akin to "a carpenter who blames his tools" (Kuhn, 1962, 79).

In the mature sciences, it is impermissible for researchers to reject the universally sanctioned paradigm for that science ñ that is blame the "tool" for the craft, without simultaneously offering up an alternative paradigm or substitute tool that possesses greater explanatory power than the existing paradigm. Of course, proof must be provided that the substitute tool is a superior tool. For a researcher to do the former ñ that is blame the tool, without simultaneously satisfying the latter ñ that is furnishing a superior tool, is to exhibit profoundly "immature" behavior in a "mature" scientific community.

A subsequent paradigm emerges when two environmental conditions simultaneously exist. The first condition is that the "scientific discovery" ñ that is the authenticator of the subsequent paradigm, must be sufficiently unprecedented to attract an enduring group of adherents away from competing modes of scientific activity ñ that is research under the out-dated paradigm. The second condition is that the discovery must be sufficiently open-ended to leave all sorts of problems for the redefined group of scientist-practitioners to solve. Satisfying these two conditions would "set the stage" for an emergence of a new paradigm for that particular science (Kuhn, 1962, 10).

Typically, scientists cannot predict where the next "unprecedented" discovery will occur in their own discipline, much less in the whole of science. There appears to be many reasons for this unpredictability. One reason, according to John Bonner, may depend "upon whether or not the world is ready to receive the information. In some cases the advance bursts forth with instant acclaim, as was the case in the reception of Darwin's principle of natural selection. The world in fact was so ready that had Darwin not proclaimed it, Wallace and others would have made the notion popular at that receptive moment in our history" (Bonner, 1969, 18-19).

A second reason for the unpredictability is that "unprecedented" discoveries almost always challenge a central concept of a science's current paradigm. The discovery is "unprecedented" not only because of its own distinctive content or merit, but also because it illuminates the contrast that exists between its content and a central concept of the current paradigm. The "shock value" associated with the latter infuses the new discovery with a certain sense of self-evidence and boldness. Bonner maintains that this illumination of contrast and associated "shock value", was evident in "Copernicus' discovery of the sun as the center of our planetary system, Darwin's theory of natural selection, and Freud's hypotheses concerning the functioning of the mind" (Bonner, 1969, 19). In each incidence, there was heated controversy as practitioners of the old and new theoretical perspectives clashed. The controversy itself greatly enhanced the stature of the "unprecedented" discovery in the minds of the redefined group of scientist-practitioners - the adherents of the most current paradigm (Bonner, 1969, 20).

Once a paradigm has emerged and has been embraced by a particular scientific community, the adherents of the paradigm, also known as ìscientistsî engage in an activity Kuhn calls "normal science" ó research that is firmly based upon one or more or the paradigm's scientific achievements. These achievements supply the particular scientific community with a foundation for further practice (Kuhn, 1962, 10). Effective research cannot be initiated until a scientific community is confident that it has obtained firm answers to questions like: "What are the fundamental entities of which the universe is composed?", "How do these interact with each other and with the senses?", and "What questions may legitimately be asked about such entities and what techniques employed in seeking solutions?" (Kuhn, 1962, 4-5).

In the emerging science of evolutionary biology, Edward O. Wilson describes normal science research as a process by which the naturalist or scientist extends the current answers concerning organismic patterns, rules, and trends, before him or her through asking questions about evolutionary process and about the history of the world. Wilson believes that the fundamental question of evolutionary biology research is: "What do these patterns, rules, and trends reveal?" (Campbell, 1996, 94). In the mature sciences, answers - or, at the very least, well-substantiated theoretical construct-answers - to questions, like those above, are the foundation for the educational tradition of that particular scientific discipline. These answers exercise a powerful influence on the thinking of the scientist-practitioners. This influence accounts for the precision and effectiveness of the discipline's research activities, while continually providing the discipline with research aims and directions (Kuhn, 1962, 4-5). Wilson contends that in evolutionary biology, the ìnaturalist ñ scientistî must go to the answers already before him or her and ask the right questions about the observed phenomenon before patterns begin to emerge from which generalities can be drawn. According to Wilson, this has been by far the most important procedure in the history of evolutionary biology ó and it represents the same process that Darwin followed when he developed his, potential, paradigm-defining theory of evolution by natural selection (Campbell, 1996, 94).

Despite the considerable explanatory power and persuasiveness manifested in evolutionary theory and neurophysiology, Kuhn contends that biology, as an entire discipline, has yet to recognize a comprehensive set of universally accepted and sanctioned achievements ñ also known as ìa paradigmî. At the end of the twentieth century, only segments of biology - such as the study of heredity via Mendel's laws - have obtained unified theories. As it has in the past, systems thinking will continue to function as a theoretical catalyst and as sinew in the facilitation of biology's forward movement towards realizing its first comprehensive paradigm.

Biology's acquisition of its first universally sanctioned paradigm is an essential prerequisite to the entire amalgam of psycho-social research disciplines making any substantial movement towards attaining a paradigm and becoming legitimate sciences. In order for a human behavior systems theory to bring the "science of human behavior" paradigm to fruition, it will first probably have to be a recognizable offspring of biology's first universally sanctioned paradigm. If Kuhn is correct in his assessment that biology is still in the throws of it's birth into the family of legitimate paradigm-based sciences, it may be decades until biology is scientifically "mature enough" to procreate. Perhaps some version of Bowen family systems theory will still be around, and theoretically attractive enough, to be pursued by the comprehensive science of Biology for an extended courtship.

 

 

 

References

Bonner, J. T. (1955). Cells and societies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Bonner, J. T. (1969). The scale of nature. New York: Harper and Row.

Bonner, J. T. (1993). Life cycles: Reflections of an evolutionary biologist. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Campbell, N. A. (1996). A conversation with . . . Dr. Edward O. Wilson. The American Biology Teacher, 58(2), 93-98.

Caskie, P. D. (1994). What kind of system is the family? Family Systems, 1(1), 7-19.

Kuhn, T. S. (1962). The structure of scientific revolutions (2nd ed. enlarged). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Wilson, E. O. (1980). Sociobiology: The abridged edition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Wilson, E. O. (1996). In search of nature. Washington: Island Press.

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